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Abstract The article presents Go rams pa’s interpretation and classification of
cognizable object as explained by Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita in his famous Tshad ma rigs gter.
The text consists of introduction to the translation of the original, translation of Go
ram pa’s commentary to the first chapter of Tshad ma rigs gter, edition of the
original, and outline of the Tibetan text.
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It is probably true that nobody who studies Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita’s Tshad ma rigs gter can
avoid referring to Go rams pa’s commentaries on this work, as he or she searches for
the answers to the numerous questions that appear during the lecture. Sa skya
Pan
˙
d
˙
ita usually takes for granted that the reader knows the basic definitions and the
necessary context. However, what might be obvious to the philosophical audience in
the thirteen century in Tibet is definitely not obvious for a modern reader in the
West. Even though Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita’s autocommentary clarifies a lot of issues from
the root text, its reading said without any exaggeration must be accompanied or
even preceded by a study of some more encyclopedic commentary like Go rams
pa’s sDe bdun mdo dang bcas pa’i dgongs pa phin ci ma log par ‘grel ba tshad ma
rigs pa’i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa (The Faultless Commentary on the Intention
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of Seven Treatises and the Sutra Elucidating the Meaning of [Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita’s]
Treasury of Epistemology).
In the first chapter on the cognizable object Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita gives no definition of
the technical terms that he uses throughout the text. From the very beginning the
reader finds himself in the very center of an intense hot philosophical debate, which
presupposes not only the knowledge of basic terminology but also the whole
philosophical background out of which the problems discussed are picked up. Thus
the tasks of the commentarial tradition of the Tshad ma rigs gter include clarifying
terminology within the conceptual system used in this treatise and contextualizing
the discussed problems, with possible solutions offered by different traditions of
Tibetan epistemology. This clear division of commentarial work is probably the
reason why Go rams pa (Go rams pa bsod nams seng ge, 1429-1489) wrote two
commentaries to the Tshad ma rigs gter: sDe bdun mdo dang bcas pa’i dgongs pa
phin ci ma log par ‘grel ba tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa and
Tshad ma rigs gter gyi dka’ gnas rnam par bshad pa sde bdun rab gsal (The
Complete Explanation of Difﬁcult Points in Treasury of Epistemology that Perfectly
Elucidates Seven Treatises). The first one is very encyclopedic and can be treated as
an introduction to the second,1 since the first one—as the title announces—is just an
explanation of general intention of the treatise and mainly aims at clarifying
terminology used in the Tshad ma rigs gter. The second one, much more extensive,
concentrates on particular epistemological problems and, as the title says, “difficult
points” debated in Tibetan epistemology. It is much more elaborate and goes much
deeper into the issues discussed in the text of Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita, which now can be
clearly restated in the light of the first commentary and then solved. The first
commentary can also be treated as a kind of shortcut to Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita’s
philosophy, providing an especially clear map of the system—following Go rams
pa’s famous, unique ability to present complicated matters in a very accessible way.
What is presented below is the translation of the first chapter of sDe bdun mdo
dang bcas pa’i dgongs pa phin ci ma log par ‘grel ba tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi don
gsal bar byed pa by Go rams pa. Meant as the introductory commentary to the first
chapter of the Tshad ma rigs gter, it explains the notion of the cognizable object,
provides basic definitions and discusses the divisions of the cognizable object. The
fact that the main concern of this chapter is only the clarification of the
terminological system set up by Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita—and not the philosophical
problems that arise within it—does not mean that there is no discussion and debate
with other views of Tibetan epistemology. Thus before presenting the translation I
will discuss a few crucial issues addressed by Go rams pa, who formulated them in a
very concise manner, perhaps even too concise for the Western reader.
Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita starts his treatise with the definition of the cognizable object as
follows: “Definition of the object: that which is knowable by mind.”2 This very
short definition is explained by Go rams pa as follows:
1 Go rams pa has the very same approach in case of his two commentaries to Pramāṇavārttika. Cf. van
der Kujip (1983, p. 122).
2 TR p. 49 [yul gyi mtshan nyid blos rig bya/].
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Definition of the object is the following: that which is to be known by mind.
Definition of the cognizable [shes bya] having equal scope is that which can be
made into an object of mind. Definition of the perceptual [gzhal bya] is that
which is to be realized by valid cognition. Definition of the established basis
[gzhi grub] is that which is observed by valid cognition. Definition of really
existent [yod nges] is that which can be seen by valid cognition.3
After rewording Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita’s formula in the first sentence, Go rams pa
provides a useful list of synonyms, which all describe the cognizable object in terms
of perception, thus cutting off all possible doubts concerning the scope of the listed
terms. The object is always something that is cognized, realized, observed, seen,
known by the mind or valid cognition and seems to be defined solely in terms the
cognitive process operating on it. Even though Go rams pa does not talk about the
object apart from cognizing it, it does not mean that the philosophical position
behind is idealism. Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita’s view—following closely Dharmakı¯rti—is
based to a large extent on the Sautra¯ntika realistic system, which did not claim that
the perceived object is in any way constructed in the act of perception itself.4
Simply, for Buddhist philosophers there is no sense in talking about the object apart
from the perception that confirms its existence.
After introducing the subject of the chapter, Go rams pa divides his commentary
into three parts: (1) refutation of non-Sa skya systems, (2) presentation of Sa skya
system and (3) rebuttal of objections to the Sa skya position.5 Out of these three I
will address mainly the first and third ones, since they are polemical while the
middle part is just the terminological map with particular definitions (the sa bcad
following the edition serves not only as the outline of the whole text but also as the
presentation of systematic divisions of the cognizable object).
Four main points on the above mentioned map are four types of cognizable object
introduced by Tibetan philosophers in the process of inventive assimilation of
Dharmakı¯rti’s system. As S´a¯kya mchog ldan says:
If to analyze the object, what comes from the scriptures is apprehended object
and object of engagement. Concerning the conventions introduced by early
Tibetans, there are appearing object and conceived object.6
Here Tibetans went much further than Dharmakı¯rti, who distinguished only two
types of the cognizable object. This introduction of two others had to become an
important issue that divided Tibetan philosophers. mTshur ston gzhon nu seng ge,
Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita’s teacher who influenced him to a large extent,7 accepts only
threefold division of the cognizable object:
3 The original cf. the edition at the end of this text.
4 Cf. Dreyfus (1997, pp. 76–79).
5 Go rams pa of course presents the view that he himself considers general Sa skya position, but
historically it is just one—and most orthodox—of quite a few ways of reading the Tshad ma rigs gter
within the Sa skya school.
6 S. p. 296 [yul la dbye na/ gzhung las ‘byung ba ni/ gzung ba’i yul dang/ ‘jug pa’i yul lo/ bod snga mas
tha snyad byas pa ni/ snang yul dang zhen yul lo/].
7 Cf. Hugon 2004, pp. xii–xv.
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Generally there are three [types] of cognizable object, namely apprehended
object, conceived object, object of engagement.8
However his student Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita accepts a fourfold division of the cognizable
object and Go rams pa in the text translated below lists them in the same order,
adding at the beginning the fourth one: the appearing object [snang yul]. Thus we
have the context for the issue raised at the beginning of “Refutation of others’
systems” in Go rams pa’s commentary as well:
Some Tibetans say that since the appearing object and the apprehended object
have the same meaning, the universal is the apprehended object of the
conceptual [cognition] and nonexistent clearly [appearing] is the apprehended
object of the reverse nonconceptual cognition.9
Go rams pa follows closely Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita in his attack on the followers of Phya pa
chos kyi seng ge, who are often referred to as “some Tibetans”. What is at stake here
is the status of the appearing object and the so-called object universal [don spyi],10
as will be shown in the analysis to follow. Before that however, the notion of reverse
nonconceptual cognition [rtog med log shes] has to be clarified.
Reverse nonconceptual cognition is the type of erroneous cognition defined as
follows in the Tshad ma rigs gter:
definition of reverse cognition: apprehension of something invalidated by
something that is not [that what was to be apprehended].11
The so called reverse cognition in the Tshad ma rigs gter is classified as non-
cognizing state of mind, so actually it is not cognition in the proper sense. It does
not apprehend the object that it seems to apprehend, it grasps something else, and
that is why it is reverse cognition or even the opposite of cognition. Actually, in the
case of reverse cognition there is no proper cognition being harmed in this way or
another but rather proper valid cognition is just replaced with invalid perception. As
‘Jam dbyangs blo gter dbang po says in his commentary to the Tshad ma rigs gter:
8 Hugon (2004, p. 4) [spyir shes pa’i yul la gsum ste/ gzung yul dang/ zhen yul dang/ ‘jug yul lo//].
9 The original cf. the edition at the end of this text.
10 The two Tibetan terms don spyi and sgra spyi come from Digna¯ga’s distinction between
śabdasāmānya and arthasāmānya. Concerning the role of don spyi in Tibetan philosophy, compare
Dreyfus (1997, pp. 251–260). Also cf. Pind (1991). Concerning the term don spyi, Tillemans says: “The
unacceptable, or completely nonexistent, type of universal which Dharmakı¯rti is supposedly refuting, is
one which is substantially existent (rdzas yod) and is a different object from its particulars (spyi don
gzhan). Tibetan commentators stress, however, that there are universals that are simple mental constructs
and have at least conventional existence. In other words, it is argued that Dharmakı¯rti recognized the
mental apoha (blo'i gzhan sel), or more exactly speaking, the don spyi, object-universal, which figures so
prominently in dGe lugs and Sa skya exegeses. This notion of a don spyi is used to great advantage in
explaining Dharmakı¯rti’s thought, although it is not clear that the term don spyi (=*arthasāmānya) itself
ever explicitly figured in this exact use in Dharmakirti’s or even in other Indian logicians’ works”
(Tillemans 1999, pp. 163–164); compare also Tillemans’ remarks on Go rams pa and Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita in
this context—Tillemans (1999, pp. 220–222, 229 n.6, 234 n.15). For an extensive analysis of don spyi
(translated as “concept”) cf. Stoltz (2006).
11 TR 84 [log rtog gi mtshan nyid ni/ de ‘dzin pa de min gyis/ gnod pa].
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Definition of reverse cognition: it is the apprehension of the object in such a
way that it is the state of mind which is invalidated by other valid cognition
[cognizing] that it is not that [object but] it is something else.12
Thus reverse cognition is not just wrong apprehension of the object that is given in
valid cognition as well. It is wrong perception because it misses the object
completely and grasps something else.
Generally there are two types of that cognition—conceptual and non-conceptual.
Go rams pa gives the following classification of them:
There are three conceptual reverse cognitions: the erroneous one concerning
shape, like apprehending a multicolored rope as a snake; the erroneous one
concerning time, like apprehending a present blue color as the blue color from
the past; the erroneous one concerning the object, like apprehending aloe tree
and juniper tree as one type.
There are two non-conceptual reverse cognitions: the error of sense
consciousness, like a sense consciousness seeing two moons; and the error
of mental consciousness, like the consciousness of seeing clearly the dream.13
In case of both types of reverse cognition, what is perceived does not exist at all,
even though it does somehow arise within the field perception.14 Hence the name
“nonexistent clearly appearing” in case of non-conceptual perception.
Go rams pa aims at showing that in the case of non-conceptual reverse cognition
the so called nonexistent clearly appearing cannot be considered an apprehended
object, since an apprehended object is an outer entity that is given to the subject
either directly or indirectly by way of its aspects. The illusion of two moons, seen
after pressing the eyeballs or dreamt, does not exist on the outside. Thus they are not
apprehended by the subject in the way that the real tree is apprehended. But still
there is something that is given in cognition, something within the field of
perception that is taken to be two moons, that looks like two moons. This is called
the appearing object.
In the case of conceptual reverse cognition, there is something to play the role of
apprehended object—a rope mistakenly taken to be a snake which is the appearing
object. The error here is just wrong conceptualization by which the concept—or the
so called object universal15—of the snake is taken to be an outer object. Non-
conceptual reverse cognition cannot be explained in that way, since there is no
12 Tshad ma rigs gter gyi mtshan ‘grel sde bdun gsal ba’i sgron me (The Commentary on Treasury of
Epistemology that is The Torch Elucidating Seven Treatises) in: TRC 377 [yul de nyid du ‘dzin pa la de
min pa gzhan yin pai tshad ma gzhag gyis gnod pa yod pa’i blo ni log shes kyi mtshan nyid].
13 G 54 [rtog pa dang rtog med log shes gnyis las/ dang po ni/ thag khra la sbrul du 'dzin pa lta bu rnam
pa la 'khrul ba dang / da ltar gyi sngon po la 'das pa'i sngon por 'dzin pa lta bu dus 'khrul pa dang / sha pa
dang shug pa gnyis rigs gcig tu 'dzin pa lta bu yul la 'khrul pa dang gsum mo// rtog med log shes la/ zla ba
gnyis snang gi dbang shes lta bu dbang shes ‘khrul pa dang/ rmi lam gsal snang gi shes pa lta bu yid shes
‘khrul pa gnyis yod do//].
14 This is also the case even when the type of the tree is mistakenly identified or when white conch is
perceived as yellow due to the jaundice (the example used by Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita). Cf. discussion of this
issue in Stoltz (2006, pp. 574–577).
15 The status of object universal is analyzed below.
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concept involved that could be blamed for erroneous experience. There is only what
appears while there is nothing that could be apprehended correctly. Determining the
status of this kind of perceptual illusions was not an easy task for Buddhist
philosophers, and the text of Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita under discussion here remains
ambiguous. As we can see in the commentary translated below, Go rams pa himself
admits that he is not certain what the original view of the Tshad ma rigs gter is—on
the one hand he claims that non-conceptual erroneous cognition does not have an
appearing object and on the other hand that the nonexistent clearly appearing, which
is the object of non-conceptual erroneous cognition, is an appearing object. The
reason for this hesitation is a very general statement of Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita himself,
who, in discussing the status of nonexistent clearly appearing and object universal,
used the general term “the object” without specifying which of the four he actually
meant. In any case what both have in common is the fact that what appears within
the field of cognition does not represent the outer object (the concept of the snake
does not represent any real snake or the rope and dreamt object does not represent
any really existing outer object).
That is why Go rams pa shortly says—and this is what the whole critique comes
down to16—that the nonexistent clearly appearing and the object universal, which
are the objects of erroneous cognition, cannot be apprehended objects. The reason is
that, whenever cognition has apprehended object, it cannot be erroneous. Thus they
are given as appearing objects. This approach was probably one of the reasons for
introducing differentiation between appearing object and apprehended object,
upheld by Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita in the Tshad ma rigs gter.
After polemics with the view of the followers of Phya pa chos kyi seng ge, Go
rams pa presents four divisions of cognizable objects:
– Division into four objects from the point of view of the way of making into an
object.
– Division into two truths from the point of view of the nature.
– Division into direct and indirect from the point of view of the object of
engagement.
– Division into two, the particular and the universal, from the point of view of the
way of engagement.
And finally he comes to the conclusion that the ultimate and the only perceptual
is the particular. This part of the text is a kind of encyclopedic dictionary to the first
chapter of the Tshad ma rigs gter. However in the third and the last part of Go rams
pa’s text the reader can clearly see that different divisions, done from different
points of view, become useful tools for dealing with the opponents who attacked
one crucial statement of Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita.
Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita claimed that ultimately the only object of valid cognition is the
particular. This statement became one of the hottest points in the debates over his
system of epistemology. And the reason was that at first sight this very statement
seems to contradict one of the main axioms of Buddhist epistemology formulated by
Digna¯ga in his main treatise (PS I 2), namely that there are only two types of
16 The other argument given by Go rams pa, following Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita, is discussed in Stoltz (2006).
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perceptuals, namely the particular in the case of direct perception and the universal
in the case of inference. Thus a severe debate over the status of the universal
began.17
Confronting this serious accusation, Go rams pa refers to his clear divisions of
the cognizable objects that he just introduced: “there are the two posited—particular
and universal—since there are two ways of comprehending: from the point of view
of own nature only the particular is comprehended, whereas the other is
comprehended from the point of view of the object universal.”
One can look at this explanation as Go rams pa’s interpretation of Digna¯ga.
Digna¯ga indeed introduces two types of cognizable objects by way of referring to
two types of cognition. Since there are two ways of cognizing, there are accordingly
two cognizable objects. But this does not mean that from the point of view of the
object in itself there are two different types. This approach in not without support in
Digna¯ga himself, who in a very concise way says “mtshan nyid gnyis gzhal bya”18
which can be understood as two characteristics [mtshan nyid], namely particular
[svalakṣaṇa, rang mtshan] and universal [sāmānyalakṣaṇa, spyi mtshan], being
referred to the one and only object: the perceptual [gzhal bya]. The perceptual itself
cannot be given apart from either of the two—and only two—ways of perception.
Since there is no third type of perception—perceiving some general perceptual in
itself, which is neither universal nor particular—the very perceptual must be in the
end either the universal or the particular. It cannot be universal, since direct
perception reveals the particular existing independently outside, and this fact is
taken for granted together with Sautra¯ntika realism mentioned above. Additionally
Go rams pa refers to the very definition of valid cognition in Dharmakı¯rti, to claim
that in the philosophy of the forefather of Buddhist epistemology “it is shown that it
is cognition that becomes the cause for adopting and rejecting the objects that can
bring benefit and harm. In this way the object that can bring benefit and is to be
adopted by valid cognition and the object that can bring harm and is to be
abandoned are exclusively the particular, since what is exclusively particular can
bring benefit and harm while the universal can not do this.” Thus there are strong
premises for admitting that ultimately the particular is the only cognizable object,
but still it is not clear why the perception referring to the universal can be called
valid cognition. Go rams pa does not explain it in detail but claims only that the
universal “is comprehended from the point of view of the object universal”. Now
out of two types of appearing object—nonexistent clearly appearing and object
universal—the second one turns out to be a crucial point in the debates on the object
17 As Dreyfus points out, the controversy was actually stimulated by the ambiguous position of the
forefathers of Tibetan epistemology and Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita’s position is “not without support” in
Dharmakı¯rti’s writings. In discussing valid cognition, Dharmakı¯rti asserts that nondeceptiveness
(avisamvādanam, mi slu ba), the defining characteristic of valid cognition, consists of the capacity to
perform a function in accordance with the way it is cognized by that cognition. Only causally effective
phenomena (vastu, dngos po) have such a capacity. So, valid cognitions are nondeceptive inasmuch as
they relate appropriately to real things (svalakṣaṇa, rang mtshan) Therefore, the conclusion that only real,
that is, specifically characterized phenomena are objects of valid cognitions is hard to resist” (Dreyfus
1997, p. 78).
18 PS I.2b.
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of cognition. The question now is: What is the so-called object universal and what
does it mean to comprehend from the point of view of it?
Unfortunately the definition of the object universal is hardly found in Go rams pa.
From Go rams pa’s commentary we know that the object universal is the
subcategory of appearing object and, in particular, is an object that appears directly
to conceptualization. The modern Tibetan dictionary of epistemology defines it as
follows: “Category of general manifestation. An imputation establishing exclusively
the conceptual manifestation or it is a manifestation in the mind similar to object.
For example it is like a vase appearing in conceptualization.”19 The object universal
is thus mental representation of the object and, according to the definition of the
universal [spyi mtshan],20 it is the basis of the universal itself and necessary point of
reference for it. The object universal is thus related to the singular object that is
represented by it and also related to the universal. As a manifestation in the mind or,
to put it more precisely, as the act of cognizing mind, object universal has its
particular moment, since it is just a singular act or mental event. At the same time it
has its general moment, since it is referred to as universal, which seems to be its
conceptual content. Thus the object universal is triggered in the mind by a
particular, but what it does is to establish or grasp a universal. These two aspects
make the object universal different from the nonexistent clearly appearing. This is
clearly stated by Go rams pa:
concerning the first one [the object universal], even though it is not a
particular, on the basis of it the object of engagement, which is the particular,
is obtained, and concerning the second one [nonexistent clearly appearing] its
own nature is not the particular and [therefore] on the basis of it object of
engagement, which is the particular, is not obtained at all.21
It is worth noticing that Go rams pa insists on the fact that in its nature a nonexistent
clearly appearing is not any particular while, talking about the object universal, he
does not refer to its nature—probably because he felt that it is not so clear or at least
ambiguous, as I pointed out above.22 Nevertheless the difference—and it is a crucial
difference—between the two is the quality of providing the possibility of obtaining
the particular. In this way the object universal—despite its mental nature—turns out
to perform the function as every self-sufficiently existing particular and this function
19 bod rgya tshad ma rig pa’i tshig mdzod 1988, p. 166 [spyi’i nang gses/ rtog pa’i snang ngo tsam du
grub pa’i sgro brtags kyi cha’am don gyi cha ‘dra blo la snang ba/ dper na/ rtog pa la snang ba’i bum pa
lta bu’o/].
20 The definition is as follows: “Phenomenon which is solely imputed by conceptualization as an object
that is not established on its own. These are non-compounded phenomena like space etc. that are there by
way of excluding what is to be negated and must depend on arising of object universal [yul rang ngos nas
grub pa ma yin par rtog pas btags pa tsam gyi chos/ nam mkha' la sogs pa dgag bya bcad pa dang don
spyi 'char ba la ltos dgos pa'i 'dus ma byas kyi chos rnams so/];” bod rgya tshad ma rig pa’i tshig mdzod
1988, p. 200.
21 The original cf. the edition at the end of this text.
22 Cf. analysis of the status of don spyi in Stoltz (2006).
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is making possible the obtainment of the particular.23 It is not particular, as is clearly
stated by Go rams pa, but one can say that to some extent it performs the function of
particular. This twofold nature of the object universal is in fact the key to
understanding the issue at stake in the polemics presented by Go rams pa in the most
important sections of the last part of his commentary.
The remaining fragment of that last part of the commentary is the review of
Indian philosophical views that Buddhist epistemology had to confront. They were
not debated in Tibetan philosophy24, since in the Land of Snow there were no other
traditions challenging Buddhist epistemology. Thus Buddhist thinkers put their
effort in refining Buddhist epistemology itself by way of debating on its internal
problems in more and more detail.
The commentary part of which is translated below is one attempt to provide a
clear conceptual frame for discussing the Tshad ma rigs gter and also for solving
intensely debated problems. Go rams pa calls it “elucidation of the meaning [don
gsal bar byed pa],” and this, indeed, is what he tries to do by giving a neat map of
the terminology that can serve as a general framework for reading Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita’s
work. Written in an accessible style, supplying basic definitions and sketching the
main ideas and contexts, it is particularly helpful as both a prolegomenon and
companion to the Tshad ma rigs gter. On top of that, Go rams pa is considered the
most faithful and orthodox commentator of Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita25 because he does not
depart from the original meaning and intention of the Tshad ma rigs gter.26 That is
why, out of so many commentaries to Tshad ma rigs gter, both within Sa skya
tradition and others, probably sDe bdun mdo dang bcas pa’i dgongs pa phin ci ma
log par ‘grel ba tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa by Go rams pa
seems one of the most natural starting points for our reception of this fundamental
treatise of Tibetan epistemology. Acknowledged conformity of Go rams pa’s
interpretation with the Tshad ma rigs gter also makes his text a very good starting
point for investigating interpretational differences within Sa skya lineage itself and
gives a clear point of reference for comparative studies of sGe lugs and rNying ma
interpretations of the Tshad ma rigs gter27 as well.
23 Cf. the analysis of similar situation in Dharmakı¯rti in Dreyfus (1997, p. 74). It is thus clear that some
difficult points discussed in Tibetan epistemology are in fact of Indian origin.
24 That is why the reason Go rams pa included them is more his respect for the tradition and
completeness of the presentation. This concise historical overview is too general to be discussed here and
getting into details would amount to writing a history of the development of Buddhist epistemology in
India, which is not the aim of this paper. Cf. Eltschinger (2014).
25 The lineage of transmission from Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita to Go rams pa cf. van der Kuijp (1983, p. 118). His
contemporary S´a¯kya mchog ldan (gser mdog pan chen śākya mchog ldan 1428–1509) was no less a
perceptive commentator of Tshad ma rigs gter but definitely a less orthodox thinker adhering also to the
view of other-emptiness [gzhan stong] fought against by Go rams pa [more about his refusal of this view
cf. Cabezo´n and Dargyay (2006, pp. 97–144)].
26 Cf. Dreyfus (1997, p. 27).
27 There is no commentary to the Tshad ma rigs gter written in the bka’ brgyud tradition, but very
interesting polemics with Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita can be found in the Tshad ma rigs gzhung rgya mtsho (The
Ocean of Epistemological Treatises) by 7th Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho (1454–1506).
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Translation
Cognizable Object [shes bya’i yul]
There are the two in the first [chapter on cognizable object]: (1) definition [and] (2)
division.
1. Definition of the object is the following: that which is to be known by mind.28
Definition of the cognizable [shes bya] having equal scope is that which can be
made into an object of mind. Definition of the perceptual [gzhal bya] is that which is
to be realized by valid cognition. Definition of the established basis [gzhi grub] is
that which is observed by valid cognition. Definition of really existent [yod nges] is
that which can be seen by valid cognition.
2. [Division]
There are three [subparagraphs] in the second [paragraph on division of
cognizable object]:
2.1 Refutation of others’ systems,
2.2 Presentation of our own system,
2.3 Rebuttal of objections.
2.1. Some Tibetans say that since the appearing object and the apprehended
object have the same meaning, the universal is the apprehended object of the
conceptual [cognition] and the nonexistent clearly [appearing] is the apprehended
object of the reverse nonconceptual cognition [rtog med log shes].29
There are two lines of reasoning in the refutation of this [view]. First, the subject
matter [chos can] is both conceptual and nonconceptual reverse cognition; it entails
[thal] that they are not erroneous cognitions, because they are the cognition having
apprehended the object.30 Secondly, the subject matter is both the universal and the
nonexistent clearly [appearing]; it entails that as for the object that can be seen they
are seen by cognition of other person nearby, because they are apprehended objects
substantially different from the cognition to which they themselves appear.31
2.2. [Presentation of our own system]
There are five in the second [subparagraph]:
28 Rewording of the definition from the Tshad ma rigs gter: “Definition of the object: that which is
knowable by mind [yul gyi mtshan nyid blos rig bya/]”, TR I 1 [p. 49].
29 Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita gives the following „definition of reverse cognition: apprehension of something
invalidated by something that is not [that what was to be apprehended] [log rtog gi mtshan nyid ni/ de
‘dzin pa de min gyis/ gnod pa]” TR 84. Cf. discussion in the introduction.
30 Go rams pa, following Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita, points out the paradoxical, and thus unwanted consequence of
the assumption that erroneous cognition really apprehends an object. Cf. discussion in the introduction to
the translation.
31 The discussion of this argument cf. Stoltz (2006).
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2.2.1 Division into four objects from the point of view of the way of
making into an object;
2.2.2 Division into two truths from the point of view of the nature [ngo
bo];
2.2.3 Division into direct and indirect [mngon lkog] from the point of view
of the object of engagement;
2.2.4 Division into two: particular and universal from the point of view of
the way of engagement;
2.2.5 Reducing to one—the particular which is the ultimate perceptual.
2.2.1. [Division into four objects from the point of view of the way of making
into an object]
There are three [parts] in the first [2.2.1]:
2.2.1.1 Analysis of phenomena becoming four objects;
2.2.1.2 Analysis of what are the four objects for a certain subject;
2.2.1.3 The nature of each of the four objects.
2.2.1.1. [Analysis of phenomena becoming four objects]
All phenomena being related to individual mind as subject [yul can] turn out to
be an appearing object, a conceived object and an object of engagement.
Concerning the apprehended object, Sautra¯ntika sets up only five external āyatanas
and in the system of Cittama¯tra an apprehended object is not maintained.
2.2.1.2. [Analysis of what are the four objects for a certain subject]
All non-erroneous non-conceptual cognitions have an appearing object, whereas
erroneous non-conceptual cognitions do not have an appearing object; all
conceptualizations [rtog pa] have an appearing object.
Concerning the apprehended object, only the two direct perceptions32 knowing a
thing [don] have it.
Concerning the conceived object, conceptualizations that are compatible with a
thing [don]33 have it.
Concerning the object of engagement, valid cognition, articulated sound that is
compatible with the thing [don], and sentient beings have it.
2.2.1.3. [The nature of each of the four objects]
There are four:
2.2.1.3.1 Appearing object,
2.2.1.3.2 Apprehended object,
2.2.1.3.3 Conceived object,
2.2.1.3.4 Object of engagement.
2.2.1.3.1 [Appearing object] Here there are
32 Two out of four direct perceptions are meant here, namely direct sense perception [dbang po mngon
sum] and direct mental perception [yid mngon sum].
33 What is meant here is the inferential cognition that refers correctly to the object that really exists when
the representation in the mind is accurate.
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2.2.1.3.1.1 Definition and
2.2.1.3.1.2 Division.
2.2.1.3.1.1. The first one [definition] is the following: whatever object that
appears by way of bringing out the aspects34 or that appears directly without
aspects.
2.2.1.3.1.2. [Division] Here are the two:
2.2.1.3.1.2.1 Appearing object of nonconceptual cognition and
2.2.1.3.1.2.2 [Appearing object] of conceptualization [rtog pa].
2.2.1.3.1.2.1. [Appearing object of nonconceptual cognition] Here are the two:
2.2.1.3.1.2.1.1 One that is appearing object through reference to
the aspects,
2.2.1.3.1.2.1.2 One that is appearing object through non-reference
to the aspects.
2.2.1.3.1.2.1.1. The first one is like the thing apprehended by direct perception as
being the knowledge of the thing [different from it].
2.2.1.3.1.2.1.2. Second one is like that which is to be experienced by direct
perception as being self-knowledge.
2.2.1.3.1.2.2. Appearing object of conceptualization is like an object universal
[don spyi].35
Alternatively, among four objects, the appearing object for valid cognition does
not exist as a substance that is different from the cognition possessing the object.
And when referring to that which appears in its own time, we refer only to three:
– that which is experienced by direct perception as being self-knowledge;
– the nonexistent clearly appearing directly to reverse [log] nonconcep-
tual cognition;
– the object universal directly appearing to conceptualization.
Concerning the second one, even though it is the appearing object of that
cognition, generally it is not appearing object, which, I think, is the intention of the
Tshad ma rigs gter, but it should be [further] analyzed.36
2.2.1.3.2. [Apprehended object] Here are
2.2.1.3.2.1. The definition: the outer thing directly bringing about [gtod byed] the
aspect similar to it in the direct perception apprehending it.
2.2.1.3.2.2. Division:
34 Tibetan term rnam pa is the translation of Sanskrit ākāra. Concerning the meaning of the term in
Indian and particularly in Buddhist philosophy cf. Kellner (2014). Cf. also McClintock (2014) and
Moriyama (2014).
35 Cf. footnote 10 in the introduction.
36 Cf. discussion in the introduction.
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2.2.1.3.2.2.1 From the point of view of the subject [yul can] it is the
object apprehended by direct sense perception and the
object apprehended by direct mental perception.
2.2.1.3.2.2.2 From the point of view of the object there are five:
physical form, sound, smell, taste, touchable.
2.2.1.3.3. [Conceived object] Here is
2.2.1.3.3.1. The definition: what is to be known when the conceiving mind makes
it important by way of apprehending it.
2.2.1.3.3.2. Here the division is:
2.2.1.3.3.2.1 Conceived object of conceptual valid cognition,
2.2.1.3.3.2.2 Conceived object of subsequent cognition.37
The first are objects of engagement of inferential valid cognition. The second are
like the very objects of engagement of both valid cognitions38 that become
conceived objects of subsequent cognition caused [drangs] by them.
2.2.1.3.4. [Object of engagement] Here is
2.2.1.3.4.1. The definition: the main one which is an object that became the basis
for engagement making the subject and the thing compatible.
2.2.1.3.4.2. Division. If it is divided from the point of view of the subject, out of
three mentioned above, in case of the first one, which is the object of engagement of
valid cognition, there are two: the object of engagement of direct perception and the
object of engagement of inference. In the case of the former one the object of
engagement of direct perception as knowledge of a thing is the outer thing as the
particular; and the object of engagement of direct perception as self-knowledge is
cognition as the particular; and the object of engagement of direct yogic perception
according to Sautra¯ntika is the particular which is skandhas specified by
37 Subsequent cognition [bcad shes] is briefly characterized by Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita as follows: “Subsequent
cognition is recollection of what is past [bcad shes ‘das pa dran pa yin]” TR, p. 78. Go rams pa gives the
following definition: “Definition of subsequent cognition: “knowledge engaging in the object that has
been realized before and is kept intact [in memory] which is knowledge contradicting projections that are
opposite to it [object] [bcad shes kyi mtshan nyid/ sngar rtogs zin gyi byed pa ma nyams pa’i don la/ log
phyogs kyi sgro ‘dogs dang ‘gal bar ‘jug pa’i rig pa].” G, p. 51. Dreyfus summarizes Sa-pan
˙
’s critique of
this concept introduced by Phya pa chos kyi seng ge: “Sa-pan
˙
grants that subsequent cognition exists, but
does not accept it as a division of nonvalid cognition. For Sa-pan
˙
, subsequent cognitions are nonrealizing
cognitions. He rejects the idea that subsequent cognitions have any cognitive role. They merely repeat a
previous cognition without contributing to the identification of an object. Hence, it is not even a
realization of a previously realized object, as Ge-luk thinkers would have it. Sa-pan
˙
compares the
identification of an already cognized object to cutting a tree already cut. Just as something that is already
established and not forgotten does not need to be reestablished, something previously understood cannot
be understood unless one forgets it in the meanwhile.
Sa-pan
˙
is particularly critical of the idea of the second moment of a perception as a subsequent
cognition. Since perception merely holds its object and since this object is in constant transformation, the
subsequent moments of perception are as valid as the first moment. Therefore, no perception can ever be a
subsequent cognition. Only the conceptions that are recollections (dran shes) of something previously
realized can be subsequent cognitions.” (Dreyfus 1997, p. 391).
38 Direct perception and inference.
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substancelessness39 and according to aspectarians [rnam rigs pa, vijñaptivādin] is
phenomenalities [chos nyid rnams].40
[In case of the latter] the object of engagement of inference is referred to as that
which is to be proven through authentic premise [rtags yang dag gi bsgrub bya].
The object of engagement of the sound is like the ox being the particular that is
the object of engagement of compatibility between the sound “ox” and the thing.
2.2.2. [Division into two truths from the point of view of the nature]
In the case of the two truths from the point of view of the nature, according to
Vaibha¯s
˙
ika when something is destroyed or inquired into by the mind, then that
nonengagement of the mind apprehending it is the definition of the truth of complete
projection. For example, it is like the vase that the mind apprehending it is not
engaged into when it is destroyed, and it is like the water known to the world the
mind apprehending it is not engaged into when it is analyzed by the mind in terms of
particular eight atomic substances.41
When something is destroyed or inquired into by the mind, that engagement of
the mind apprehending it is the definition of absolute truth. For example, it is like
the a¯yatana of form as it is accepted, for it is said in Abhidharmakośa:
If something is destroyed or excluded intellectually [blo yis gzhan bsal]
Mind does not engage into it.
It exists as complete projection as vase or water.
The absolute exists the other way.42
39 More on this topic cf. John D. Dunne saying: “In practice, the Buddhist adept is meant to realize all
four aspects of that truth, and one such aspect is impermanence, especially as applied to the
psychophysical aggregates (skandha). Certainly, on Dharmakı¯rti’s system the constituents that make up
the aggregates can be considered causally efficient, ultimately real particulars. Nevertheless, the
impermanence of those particulars is not ultimately real. Instead, as with any quality applied to that which
possesses it, impermanence is formed through a process of abstraction and exclusion. That is, a quality
such as impermanence is conceptually abstracted from the particulars it qualifies, but in ontological terms,
that quality is reducible to the particulars themselves” (Dunne 2006, p. 509).
40 The conception of three natures [mtshan nyid gsum] is meant here. Among these three natures there are
two that are considered as phenomenality or absolute truth, namely yongs su grub pa and one type of
gzhan gyi dbang, which is pure [dag pa’i gzhnan dbang]. The other two: ma dag pa’i gzhan dbang and
kun brtags are considered to be the truth of complete projection [kun rdzob].
I decided to translate chos nyid as “phenomenality” to preserve in English the affinity from Sanskrit and
Tibetan between dharma [chos] as phenomenon and dharmatā [chos nyid] in the sense of absolute truth
[don dam bden pa].
41 The eight atomic substances [rdul rdzas brgyad] according to abhidharmic philosophy are divided into
two groups. The first group encompasses the earth atom [sa rdul], water atom [chu rdul], fire atom [me
rdul] and the wind atom [rlung rdul]. The second one encompasses the ones based on the previous four:
the form atom [gzugs rdul], smell atom [dri rdul], taste atom [ro rdrul] and the atom of the touchable [reg
bya’i rdul].
42 A, p.18 [6.5]. Concerning the relation of Vasubandhu and Buddhist epistemology after Dignaga,
Arnold says that the latter “retains the basic intuition underlying Vasubandhu’s approach: the idea that
there are two fundamentally different kinds of things (the reducible and the ontologically basic) and that
the “two truths” (or, emphasizing sat rather than satya, two kinds of existents) should be understood as
consisting of two sets of enumerable entities. Now, however, it is not dharmas that are said to constitute
the set of “ultimately existent” (paramārthasat) phenomena, but svalakṣaṇas. And where Vasubandhu
had (in keeping with the conventional sense of the Sanskrit word) understood svalakṣaṇas as definitions
individuating dharmas as categories, svalakṣaṇas are now viewed as the unique, discrete phenomena that
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Sautra¯ntika holds that the definitions of the two are two phenomena: the one that is
effective [don byed nus pa] on the absolute [level] and the one that is not,43 since it
is said that “the absolute is whatever is effective,”44 etc.
Cittama¯tra maintains that the definition of the truth of complete projection is
whatever thoroughly increases afflictions while being really perceived [dngos su
dmigs], and the definition of absolute truth is whatever necessarily increases complete
purity while being really perceived. Since in Abhidharmasamuccaya it is said:
The perceived [object] that thoroughly expands afflictions while being
perceived, exists as complete projection. The perceived [object] that expands
complete purity while being perceived, exists as absolute.45
Madhyamaka mantains that the definition of absolute truth is that which is
apprehended by the apprehension seeing really. For example, it is like that which is
apprehended by the apprehension of the a¯rya’s mind-stream in equipoise. The
definition of the truth of complete projection is that which is apprehended by the
apprehension seeing falsely.46 For example the real object of the mind of the
ordinary being. As it is said in Madhyamakāvatāra:
Since all things are seen really and falsely,
There is the apprehension of two natures: real and false.
Any object seen really is suchness;
And what is seen falsely is complete projection, as [Buddha] said.47
Footnote 42 continued
are the direct objects of perceptual cognition—such that svalakṣaṇas here would correspond to what had
been, for Vasubandhu, the potentially innumerable tokens of the type dharma. These ontological prim-
itives are, moreover, here defined particularly by their being causally efficacious—which means (in terms
of the epistemological concerns of this program) by their capacity in particular to cause perceptual
cognitions” (Arnold 2005, p. 28).
43 Cf. summary of Sautra¯ntika theory: “Given the theory of causality, the idea of spatiotemporal
restriction then serves to positively establish the entire Sautra¯ntika system:
(1) Whatever exists, occupying space and time, is produced (kṛtaka) or conditioned (saṃskṛta) by a
cause, because spatiotemporal restriction is impossible without a cause.
(2) A conditioned, individual and impermanent thing is able to produce an effect through restricting the
effect to a particular place and time (deśakālaniyama) in accordance with its own spatiotemporal location.
[¼ x’, y’ and z’]
(3) A pervasive and permanent thing, if it existed, could not produce an effect because it would be
unable to restrict the effect to a particular place and time; this is because it would have no spatiotemporal
location of its own.
From this theory of causality, one can derive the ontological distinction between the individual and the
universal, and thus the theory of momentariness, in the following way:
(1) Only the individual (svalakṣaṇa) is causally efficacious (arthakriyāsamartha) and therefore
ultimately real (paramārthasat). A pervasive and permanent thing such as the universal (sāmānya) is
causally inefficacious and therefore not existent in reality (asat).
(2) Because a pervasive and permanent or non-momentary thing does not exist in reality due to its lack
of causal efficacy, all existents are exclusively impermanent (anitya) or momentary (kṣaṇika)”
(Yoshimizu 2007, pp. 1073–1074).
44 PV III 3a.
45 AS p. 56 [I].
46 Cf. C 6.23-31.
47 C p. 102 [6.23].
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2.2.3. [Division into direct and indirect from the point of view of the object of
engagement]
Concerning the two: the direct and indirect from the point of view of the object of
engagement there is:
2.2.3.1 Definition and
2.2.3.2 Division.
2.2.3.1. Here the definition is what is to be realized without referring to the
universal and what is to be realized through the universal.
2.2.3.2. Here the division is into:
2.2.3.2.1 Division of the direct,
2.2.3.2.2 Division of the indirect.48
2.2.3.2.1. Here is the division into:
2.2.3.2.1.1 Division from the point of view of object,
2.2.3.2.1.2 Division from the point of view of subject.
2.2.3.2.1.1. Here are the two:
2.2.3.2.1.1.1 The bearer of quality [chos can]
2.2.3.2.1.1.2 Phenomenality.
2.2.3.2.1.1.1. Here there are the [outer] thing and cognition.
2.2.3.2.1.2. Division from the point of view of subject is done into two:
2.2.3.2.1.2.1 Division from the point of view of non-conceptual non-
erroneous [cognition],
2.2.3.2.1.2.2 Division from the point of view of non-conceptual erroneous
cognition.
2.2.3.2.1.2.1. Here are three direct ones in:
– direct perception as knowledge of the thing,
– direct perception as self-knowledge,
– direct yogic perception.
They are like the following: the first one is five things such as form etc.; the
second one is all cognitions; the third one is phenomenality.
2.2.3.2.1.2.2. They are like two moons being the direct for the sense
consciousness of the appearing of two moons.49
2.2.3.2.2. Division of the indirect is done into
2.2.3.2.2.1 Division of the object and
2.2.3.2.2.2 Division of the subject.
48 Compare the discussion on Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita’s and Go rams pa’s understanding of this term in Dreyfus
(1997, pp. 416–427).
49 Cf. discussion of this example in the introduction.
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2.2.3.2.2.1. Here are the three above mentioned [and they can be described] thus.
The first one is the vase that is the indirect for the conceptualization apprehending
the vase. Concerning cognition it is the cognition of one’s own mindstream that is
the indirect for the person who does not have direct cognition of other mind’s
cognition. Phenomenality is the indirect for ordinary beings.
2.2.3.2.2.2. Division from the point of view of the subject is done into
2.2.3.2.2.2.1 Division from the point of view of inference,
2.2.3.2.2.2.2 Division from the point of view of the state of mind that is not
valid cognition.
2.2.3.2.2.2.1. There are three indirects for the inference based on the thing [dngos
stobs], inference based on trust, and inference based on opinion—they are what is
proven in these three reasonings [gtan tshigs].
2.2.3.2.2.2.2. There are three indirects as
2.2.3.2.2.2.2.1 [Object of] sequential cognition,
2.2.3.2.2.2.2.2 [Object of] reverse cognition,
2.2.3.2.2.2.2.3 [Object of] doubt.
2.2.3.2.2.2.2.1. Like the blue [colour], which is the indirect of the reliable [nges]
cognition caused [drangs] by direct sense perception apprehending [it] earlier.
2.2.3.2.2.2.2.2. Like the permanent sound, which is the indirect for the
conceptualization apprehending permanent sound.
2.2.3.2.2.2.2.3. Like a direct doubt of somebody doubting whether sound is
permanent or impermanent.
Therefore if there is something that is the direct for reverse non-conceptual
cognition, it would not necessarily be the direct; and if there is something that is the
indirect in case of reverse conceptual cognition, it would not necessarily be the
indirect. This is because if there is something that is an appearing object of the
reverse nonconceptual cognition, it is not necessarily an existent [yod pa], and
because if there is something that is a conceived object of reverse conceptual
cognition, it is not necessarily an existent. In the case of that which is the indirect of
the doubt, some parts of the thing are indirect and the others are not indirect.
2.2.4. [Division into two: particular and universal from the point of view of the
way of engagement]
In the case of particular and universal from the point of view of the way of
engagement there is
2.2.4.1 Definition and
2.2.4.2 Division.
2.2.4.1. Respectively, [the first one is] the thing that stays autonomous [ma ‘dres
par gnas pa] in terms of object, time, essence50 and [the second is] projection [sgro
btags] appearing as common in terms of object, time, essence. Or else, the thing
50 Cf. Yoshimizu (2007, pp. 1067–1069).
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staying as uncommon and projection appearing as common, since in Pramāṇavi-
niścaya it is said:
They are the essence of the thing staying as uncommon;
And the particular itself.51
So [the topic] is known in both ways: directly [from Dharmakı¯rti]52 and indirectly
[from Go rams pa].53
2.2.4.2.1. If the particular is divided, there are
2.2.4.2.1.1 the particular which is a thing [don] and
2.2.4.2.1.2 the particular which is consciousness.
2.2.4.2.1.1. Here there is
2.2.4.2.1.1.1 The matter which is an outer thing [don] and
2.2.4.2.1.1.2 The matter which is an inner thing.
2.2.4.2.1.1.1. Here there are five outer a¯yatanas like the form etc.
2.2.4.2.1.1.2. Here there are five inner a¯yatanas like the eye etc.
2.2.4.2.1.2. If the particular which is consciousness is divided, there are six
groups of conditioned consciousness [rnam par shes pa] and the related ones
[’khor]54.
2.2.4.2.2. If the generally characterized object is divided, previous Tibetan
thinkers said that there are two: the universal of the exclusion [ldog pa]55 which is
51 PVin 1.153.1.
52 According to Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita, claiming to follow Dharmakı¯rti of course, these crucial notions are
understood as follows: “Apprehending of a particular is nonconceptual. Apprehending of the universal is
conceptual. Here particular is the thing and universal is that which does not exist as object established.
The so called particular itself, individuals, thing, substance, the isolated, the absolute, etc. are established
as the ones that are effective, substance, as unmixed with other, as cause and result. They are what is to be
accepted and what is to be abandoned into which normal beings engage or withdraw from. So since they
are the object of engagement, they have the same meaning as the thing. […]
The universal, apoha, the reverse, devoid of aspects, non-autonomous, related—the so called relative
etc.—do not stay within absolute. They are not established as any object. Not being the object of sense,
they are projections of the mind. [rang mtshan ‘dzin pa rtog med de/ spyi ‘dzin pa ni rtog pa yin/ de la
rang mtshan dngos po ste/ spyi ni dngos por grub pa med/ rang gi mtshan nyid gsal ba dngos po rdzas log
pa don dam pa zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni don byed nus pa rdzas phan tshun rna 'dres pa rgyu dang 'bras
bur grub pa skye bu thams cad kyi blang dor bya ba'i 'jug yul yin pas dngos po don du don gcig pa yin te/
[…] spyi dang/ gzhan sel dang/ ldog pa dang/ rnam gcos dang/ ‘drel pa dang/ ‘brel pa dang/ kun rdzob
ces bya ba la sogs pa ni/ don la mi gnas pa/ dngos por ma gdub pa/ dbang po’i yul ma yin pa blos sgro
brtags pa/]” TR 85n.
53 Cf. discussion of Go rams pa’s understanding of rang mtshan in: Yoshimizu (2007, pp. 1067–1069).
Also cf. Yoshimizu (2004, pp. 117–133); Dreyfus (1997, pp. 67–82, 90–94, 111–118).
54 In other words, the division is made into the so called main mind [gtso sems], including all the above
mentioned six consciousnesses [mig gi rnam par shes pa, rna ba’i rnam par shes pa, sna’i rnam par shes
pa, lce’i rnam par shes pa, lus kyi rnam par shes pa, yid kyi rnam par shes pa] and mental acts [sems
byung] which are called ‘khor—the ones related [to the main mind].
55 Go rams pa refers here to the dge lugs system in which ldog pa, as Tillemans explains, functions it the
context of realism: “although objects of thought, such as universal, sādhya etc, are themselves no more
than mind-created appearances/representations (snang ba = pratibhāsa) or exclusions (ldog pa¼vyāvṛtti),
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non-implicative negation [med dgag]56 and the universal of intellectual apoha [blo’i
gzhan sel]57. However the explanation in the texts says that
there are three universals based on thing, no-thing and both; the universals and
also the three aspects are there because they are based on thing, no-thing and both.58
Or else there can be division into four:
– universal of the one [category] divided into different ones,
– universal of different ones reduced to one,
– universal of the one appearing as one,
– universal of the different ones appearing as different.
This is because similar divisions are made in case of apoha, since universality
[spyi], universal and apoha have the same meaning.59
Footnote 55 continued
it does not follow that if x is such an object of thought, x is mind-created—real particulars can be said to
be the ascertained objects (nges yul), or equally, to use the words of dGe ’dun grub pa and lCang skya rol
pa’i rdo rje, they are the explicit objects (dngos yul) of thought; elsewhere in Tsong kha pa and virtually
all other dGe lugs pa writers on the matter, it is routinely mentioned that they actually appear (snang ba)
to thought” (Tillemans 1999, p. 216). Compare also Tillemans (1999, pp. 222–224).
The term ldog pa in Sa skya tradition is understood in the following way (note that Dreyfus translates
ldog pa as distinguisher): “Only individuals (gsal ba, vyakti) are real. Thus universals, being universally
characterized phenomena and not specific individuals, can be only unreal. They are conceptual
characteristics (known as distinguishers, ldog pa, vyāvṛtti) through which we categorize things. The
reason universally characterized phenomena are unreal is they do not meet the three sets of identity
conditions delineated by Dharmakı¯rti. S´a¯kya Chok-den, for example, defines a universal as that unique
distinguisher which is the mere preclusion of [things of] discordant kinds.’ A universal is a distinguisher;
that is, it is not a real property but a negatively constructed one. For example, the universal cowness is not
some essential property that all cows would share but merely the exclusion of all cows from a class (non-
cow) to which they do not belong” (Dreyfus 1997, p. 154.
56 Concerning non-implicative negation [prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag] Avalokitavrata says: “This
[prasajyapratiṣedha] has the following characteristics: (1) it does not show the sign of arthāpatti; (2) is
devoted to negation, aims only at negation, i.e. simply negates what is asserted by the other party; (3) does
not affirm the existence of an entity or non-entity; (4) having [the characteristic of] negation and without
having [those of] implication and the affirmation of an entity, expresses [the object of negation] by its
own word, as when one, meaning ‘not a Brahman’ says ‘not a Brahman’ by which he simply makes
negation.” Quotation translated in: Kajiyama 1973, p. 170.
57 According to Go rams pa one of the possible divisions of apoha is into [yod pa gzhan sel] and [med pa
gzhan sel]. The first one is further divided into sound apoha [sgra’i gzhan sel] and intellectual apoha
[blo’i gzhan sel]; Cf. his sde bdun mdo dang bcas pa’i dgongs pa phin ci ma log par ‘grel ba tshad ma rigs
pa’i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa in: dpal sa skya pa’i tshad ma rig pa’i gzhung gces bsdus, G 71. Cf. also
Tillemans’ remark quoted in footnote 10.
58 PV III 51 c. As Dreyfus says, “Sa-gya thinkers seem to be on stronger grounds when they argue that
realism is unsound as an interpretation of Dharmakı¯rti’s ideas. Go-ram-ba denounces one of the main Ge-
luk interpretive moves: that which differentiates universal (spyi, sāmānya) and universally characterized
phenomena (spyi mtshan, sāmānyalakṣana). No such distinction is ever made by Dharmakı¯rti, argues Go-
ram-ba. On the contrary, Dharmakı¯rti repeatedly identifies these two. For example, Dharmakı¯rti specifies
three types of universally characterized phenomena: ‘Since they rely on either thing, nonthing, [or] both,
these universals are also threefold.’ This division serves as a typology of both universals and universally
characterized phenomena. Itsuggests no difference between the two. Therefore, their separation is without
solid basis in Dharmakı¯rti’s system. Universals can be no more real than universally characterized
phenomena” (Dreyfus 1997, p. 157).
59 As Dreyfus says, „Sa-pan
˙
provides a parallel list for the conceptual domain of universally
characterized phenomena: universal (spyi, sāmānya), elimination of others (gzhan sel, anyāpoha),
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2.2.5. Reducing to one: the particular that is the ultimate perceptual.
Concerning reducing to one—the particular which is the ultimate perceptual—if
you think what it means to say that the perceptual is particular only as in [quotation]
“Particular only [is] the perceptual”60, then generally according to the tradition of texts
on reasoning [rtog ge] it means that first after identifying what is known as valid
cognition for the ones that have philosophical system and the ones who do not have,
there comes the moment for proving that the teacher similar to that is the embodiment
of valid cognition; because after identifying that [valid cognition as] non-deceptive
[mi bslu] clarifying of the object not known before, later it is said that “Bhagavan that
has it is valid cognition itself.”61 Concerning the meaning of what is known as valid
cognition for everyone who is engaged in a philosophical system and who is not,
Pramāṇaviniścaya says: “Concerning achieving what is beneficial and abandoning
what is not beneficial, one starts with reliable and true [nges par yang dag pa]
cognition.”62 And it is shown that it is cognition that becomes the cause for adopting
and rejecting the objects that can bring benefit and harm. In this way the object that can
bring benefit and is to be adopted by valid cognition and the object that can bring harm
and is to be abandoned are exclusively the particular since what is exclusively
particular can bring benefit and harm while the universal can not do this. As it is said,
“Since what is to be accepted and abandoned have consequences, all beings engage
into them”63and “Why to pursue and investigate the object that is not effective?”64 It is
only the particular which, when comprehended by direct perception that is the
knowledge of the thing, is the apprehended object. When it is comprehended by direct
inference, it is the conceived object. Based on these two valid cognitions at the time
when the being engages into it, there is object of engagement because of
nondeceptiveness. Concerning the intention here auto-commentary to the Tshad ma
rigs gter says: “If one thoroughly comprehends [’jal] this very particular, it is the
object of engagement. If one comprehends the indirect, it is the conceived object. If
somebody is engaged in both as well, then they are objects of engagement because of
non-deceptivness.”65 The meaning of the phrasing “directly comprehends” and also
what is the meaning of phrasing “thoroughly comprehending” is known through the
modifier.66
Footnote 59 continued
distinguisher (ldog pa, vyāvṛtti), preclusion (rnam gcod, vyavaccheda), indeterminate (literally mixed,
'dres pa), relation ('brel ba, sambandha), relative (kun rdzob, saṃvṛti). These phenomena do not exist in
reality (don la mi gnas pa) for they are superimposed (sgro btags pa) by thought” (Dreyfus 1997, p. 77).
60 PV III 53 d.
61 PV II 7 a. Concerning interpretation of this verse and Buddha as embodiment of valid cognition in
Dharmakı¯rti, cf. Van Bijlert (1989, pp. 115–120 and 158–168). Also cf. Ruegg (1994); Silk (2002);
Steinkellner (1983).
62 PVin 1.152.3.
63 PVin 1.173.4.
64 PV I 211 ab.
65 TR 53 (autocommentary to 11a).
66 tshig grogs—literally “accompanying word”. technical term of Tibetan grammar referring to words
modifying or enriching the meaning of the words they accompany. Adjectives, adverbs etc. are included
into this category. Here the terms “directly” and “thoroughly” are meant.
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In short, when valid cognition engages only in comprehending the particular by
way of direct perception and inference, then even though the perceptual is twofold
from the point of view of the way of engaging, namely, particular and universal,
only the particular as an object of engagement is the perceptual. This is non-
erroneous intention of the phrase “particular only [is] the perceptual”67. As it is said
in the commentary of Devendrabuddhi,
Since it is only the particulars which can be comprehended [rtogs] from the
point of view of their own nature and of the other, how can they be defined?
[They are presented] by way of two perceptuals.68
2.3 [Rebuttal of objections]
There are two [paragraphs] in the rebuttal of objections:
2.3.1 Rebuttal of the objection concerning the nonexistence of the object
of erroneous cognition,
2.3.2 Rebuttal of the objection concerning the apprehended object as a
particular.
2.3.1. Here are four:
2.3.1.1 Rebuttal of objection concerning the contradiction in claiming two
perceptuals,
2.3.1.2 Rebuttal of the objection concerning the similarity of objects i.e.
the object universal and the nonexistent clearly [appearing],
2.3.1.3 Rebuttal of the objection concerning contradiction with experience,
2.3.1.4 Rebuttal of the entailment [thal ba] that negation [dgag pa] is not
realized by valid cognition.
2.3.1.1. If someone says: “If at the time of engaging by way of comprehending
exclusively the particular by the two: direct perception and inference, the
apprehended object is only a particular, then there is contradiction, with acarya
Digna¯ga claiming that there are two perceptuals”, there is no fault [in our system].
This is because there are the two posited—particular and universal, since there are
two ways of comprehending: from the point of view of own nature only a particular
is comprehended and the other is comprehended from the point of view of the object
universal.69
2.3.1.2. If someone says: “If object universal—despite its nonexistence in reality
[don]—is a perceptual, then also nonexistent clearly [appearing] is similar to it”,
there is no fault [in our system]. This is because concerning the first one [object
universal], even though it is not a particular, on the basis of it the object of
engagement, which is the particular, is obtained,70 and concerning the second one
[nonexistent clearly appearing] its own nature is not the particular and [therefore] on
the basis of it object of engagement, which is the particular, is not obtained at all.
67 PV III 53 d.
68 D 144.
69 Cf. discussion in the introduction and also Dreyfus (1997, p. 78).
70 Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita and Go rams pa in this case follow Dharmakı¯rti. Cf. Dreyfus (1997, p. 74).
Cognizable Object in Tshad ma rigs gter According... 977
123
2.3.1.3. If someone says: “If the appearing object is not the particular, it
contradicts the fact that it appears clearly to the cognition”, there is no fault [in our
system]. This is because there are two parts: the part of the aspect appearing clearly
to conceptualization and the part of projection referring to it as external. Out of
these two the first one is cognition and the second is the universal.
2.3.1.4. If someone says: “It entails nonexistence of valid cognition compre-
hending a nonexistent thing, since the object of engagement of the valid cognition is
the object that becomes the cause for performing accepting and rejecting, so it must
be a particular”, there is no fault [in our system]. This is because of the
[aforementioned] analysis whether there is or is not valid cognition comprehending
nonexistent thing.
Themeaningof that it is explained non-erroneously by the four and a half stanzas of the
Tshadma rigs gter from “If to say that, since [Dignaga] accepts two objects, it invalidates
[Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita’s position]” to “since you prove […], there is no contradiction.”71
2.3.2. Here are the two:
2.3.2.1 Objection,
2.3.2.2 Answer.
2.3.2.1. It is said: “It is not admissible to accept that the perceptual which is
apprehended object is the particular only. This is because the wise one negated the
apprehended object being an outer thing [and] here [in the Tshad ma rigs gter] it is
not possible for the apprehended object to be cognition.”
2.3.2.2. There are three:
2.3.2.2.1 The teaching of general presentation of tenets,
2.3.2.2.2 Refutation of other [scholars’] analysis,
2.3.2.2.3 Proving the sugata tradition.
2.3.2.2.1. Non-Buddhists [Tīrthikas] who say that the nature [ngo bo nyid] is the
cause claim the nature as a cause. Followers of I¯s´vara claim I¯s´vara as a cause.
71 The fragment mentioned is as follows: “They say, if [Dignaga] accepts two objects, it invalidates [Sa
skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita’s position that there is only one]. From the point of view of the way of engagement there are
two: particular and universal. If they say that even nonexistent is similar to the perceptual, then
concerning this, there can’t be any purpose for that object. Appearance such as a strand of hair etc. is
mind itself. Appearance as a strand of hair is not established as an object. So if to analyze whether it exists
as an object or does not exist, it is universal. If they say: both nonexistent things object universal and
nonexistent clearly appearing are established together with self-knowing and that is why they are clear,
then both mistaken cognitions have no object but because they are experienced by self-knowing, they are
cognitions themselves. Moreover because of apprehending non-being, they are mistaken cognitions. If
they say, if there is no object that is a particular, the nonexistence of the object contradicts the perceptual,
then since you prove whether what is to be rejected is the existing or nonexisting object, there is no
contradiction [yul gnyis bzhed pas gnod ce na/ /'jug tshul sgo nas rang spyi gnyis/ /med pa'ang gzhal byar
mtshungs she na/ /de la yul gyi dgos nus med/ /skra soTa snang ba blo nyid yin/ /skrar snang don la grub
pa med/ /de ni dngos por yod med ces/ /rtog pas dpyod na spyi mtshan yin/ /dngos med gnyis po rang rig
gi/ /shugs la grub pas gsal zhe na/ /'khrul shes gnyis la yul med cing/ /rang rig gis ni myong ba'i phyir/ /
shes pa nyid yin de yang ni/ /med pa 'dzin phyir 'khrul shes yin/ /rang mtshan min pa'i yul med na/ /dngos
med gzhal byar 'gal zhe na/ /dgag bya dngos por yod med ces/ /bsgrub pa'i phyir na 'gal ba med/].” TR
11d-15.
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Sa¯m
˙
khya claims prakṛti as cause. Leftovers eaters72 and two S´ra¯vaka schools73
claim atoms as it [a cause]. Cittama¯trins claim that all appearances [snang ba] are
mind. Nih
˙
svabha¯vava¯dins74 admit that all dharmas are on the absolute [level] free
from projections [spros pa dang bral ba] and that on the relative [level] they are
acceptable as being similar either to Vastusatpada¯rthava¯dins [S´ra¯vaka] or to worldly
opinions.
2.3.2.2.2. Claiming that nature is the cause is not admissible since it is
undermined by the argumentation refuting creation without the cause. Claiming
I¯s´vara and prakṛti as cause is also not admissible since it is undermined by the
argument refuting creation from the permanent.75
2.3.2.2.3. Here are the two:
2.3.2.2.3.1 Identification of the intention and
2.3.2.2.3.2 The way it was proven by a¯charyas.
2.3.2.2.3.1. When addressing conventions sugata proclaimed atoms; and there are
two systems—that of Vaibha¯s
˙
ika and that of Sautra¯ntika. When addressing thatness
of the conventional, he proclaimed Cittama¯tra. Concerning that there are two
[systems], that of true and false aspects. When addressing thatness of the absolute,
he referred to all dharmas as free from projections.
2.3.2.2.3.2. Thus out of these four Buddhist systems, which one was settled by
a¯charyas? Concerning this question there are two
2.3.2.2.3.2.1 Knowledge of the real [outer] thing,76
2.3.2.2.3.2.2 Knowledge of the aspect [in cognizing consciousness]77
2.3.2.2.3.2.1. When accepting [the system of knowledge of the outer thing] he
rejected the claim of Vaibha¯s
˙
ika, that the sense consciousness apprehends directly
without aspects the outer object simultaneous with it. Then he proclaimed the
system of Sautra¯ntika, which claims the cognition of the outer object [phyi don
rtogs] in the way that after three conditions78 coming together in the first moment in
the second moment there is only sense consciousness born having an aspect. As it is
72 The so called “leftovers eaters [gzegs zan pa]” are the followers of Kan
˙
a¯da (Kan
˙
abhaks
˙
a or Kan
˙
abhuj,
around 200-400 A.D.), legendary founder of Vais´es
˙
ika whose names mean “atom eater”.
73 Vaibha¯s
˙
ika and Sautra¯ntika are meant here.
74 The term refers to both Madhyamaka schools, namely, Sva¯tantrika and Pra¯san˙gika.
75 Locus classicus for these critiques are of course first chapter of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, sixth
chapter of Madhyamakāvatāra [dbu ma la ‘jug pa], cf. also Śūnyatāsaptati 1–6.
76 don rig—here as synonym for philosophical systems of S´ra¯vakaya¯na.
77 rnam rig—Cittama¯tra school.
78 The conditions meant here are: objective condition [mig rkyen] being the thing perceived, subjective
condition [bdag rkyen] being the sense organ, and immediate condition [de ma thag rkyen] being the
mind.
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known from the words of a¯carya himself: “If engaging in analysis of the outer
[object], I fully rely on the level of Sautra¯ntika.”79
2.3.2.2.3.2.2. At the time of proclaiming of knowledge of the aspect, he rejected
the claim of true aspectarians that gross appearances [rags pa snang ba] are truly
established within sense consciousness and proclaimed lack of aspects, since it is
said “Thus object and consciousness do not exist as gross appearances.”80 So then
there are two [traditions] here: Sautra¯ntika and Cittama¯tra. If the above formulated
objection is treated by way of Sautra¯ntika, the first argument81 does not hold
because in this tradition the outer object referred to through the aspect is referred to
as an apprehended object.
If it is treated by way of Cittama¯tra, [the same] is claimed, since in this tradition
the subject and object got on the basis of apprehended object is not established. That
is why in the Tshad ma rigs gter it is said:
As long as the outer is accepted, for that long the cause is said to be an
apprehended object. If what is to be cognized is posited as inside one, object
and subject are not established.82
The explanation of the ﬁrst chapter being the analysis of the object is completed.
79 Tibetan Classics edition does not identify the source of quotation but only indicates that this sentence is
similar to Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita’s formulation from his autocommentary. However in dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam
bshad ‘jam dbyangs bla ma dgyes pa’i zhal lung by 'jam mgon 'ju mi pham rnam rgyal rgya mtsho (The
Complete Explanation of Madhyamaka¯lam
˙
ka¯ra Called Oral Transmission Rejoicing the Guru Manjuśri)
which is his the commentary to S´a¯ntaraks
˙
ita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāra, this sentence is quoted again and
attributed explicitly to Dharmakı¯rti. Both editions of Go rams pa’s commentary I used render this sentence as
follows: gal te phy rol dpyod la ‘jug pa ni/ kho bos mdo sde’i skabs la rnam par brten/while Jamgo¨n Mipham
version reads: gal te phy rol dpyod la ‘jug pa ni/ kho bo mdo sde’i skas la rnam par brten/. Apart from small
difference in case of agentive particle, there is also skas instead of skabs in the version from ‘Jam mgon mi
pham. In translation I follow his version, since skabs does not make good sense in the sentence.
Verse-Index of Dharmakīrti’s works (Tibetan versions) by E. Steinkellner (1977) does not indicate this
sentence.
The question of Sautra¯ntika view in Dharmakı¯rti’s philosophy was quite extensively discussed in
Western literature. Cf. Arnold (2008, D 85–87, 99–105, 380–385), Dunne (2004, pp. 58n., 70-74), Kellner
(2011).
80 PV III.211 ab.
81 The argumentation presented in 2.3.2.
82 TR I 28 [s. 68].
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Edition of the original
The text below is the edition based on the woodblock print original reproduced in
the collected works of Go rams pa:
Kun-mkhyen go-rams-pa bsod-nams-seṅge’i gsuṅ ‘bum, Dehra-Dun: Sakya
College 1996, vol. 2, pp. 387–400.
The text was compared with two latest editions of Go rams pa’s commentary:
K1- dpal sa skya pa’i tshad ma rig pa’i gzhung gces bsdus, New Delhi: Institute
of Tibetan Classics 2006 (bod kyi gtsug lag gces bdus vol. 20), pp. 40–49.
K2—Tshad ma rigs gter rtsa ba dang ‘grel pa bzhugs, Sichuan: People’s Press
2008, pp. 68–79;
In square brackets are the titles of the sections inserted by the editor of Institute
of Tibetan Classics included into the translation as well. Numbers within the text
indicate the page of the Sakya College edition. The edition is followed by the
outline of the chapter showing the structure of the text.
\387[ shes bya yul/
dang po la gnyis te/ dang po ni yul gyi mtshan nyid blo’i rig par bya ba/ de dang
khyab mnyam pa’i shes bya’i mtshan nyid/ blo’i yul du byar rung ba/ gzhal bya’i
mtshan nyid/ tshad mas rtogs par bya ba/ gzhi grub kyi mtshan nyid/ tshad mas
dmigs pa/ yod nges kyi mtshan nyid/ tshad mas bltar rung ba’o//
gnyis pa la gsum ste/ gzhan lugs dgag /rang lugs bzhag /rtsod pa spang ba’o//
[gzhan lugs dgag pa/]
dang po ni bod kha cig snang yul dang/ gzung yul don gcig pas\388[ don spyi
de rtog pa’i gzung yul dang/ med pa gsal ba de rtog med log shes kyi gzung yul yin
zhes zer ro//
‘di dgag pa la rigs pa gnyis las/ dang po ni/ rtog pa dang rtog med log shes gnyis
po chos can/ ‘khrul shes ma yin par thal/ gzung yul can gyi shes pa yin pa’i phyir/
gnyis pa ni/ don spyi dang med pa gsal ba gnyis po chos can/ mthong rung gi yul na
gnas pa’i gang zag gzhan gyi shes pas mthong bar thal/ rang snang ba’i shes pa las
rdzas tha dad pa’i gzung yul yin pa’i phyir/
[rang lugs bzhag pa/]
gnyis pa la lnga ste/ yul du byas tshul gyi sgo nas yul bzhir dbye ba/ ngo bo’i sgo
nas bden pa gnyis su dbye ba/ ‘jug yul gyi sgo nas mngon lkog gnyis su dbye ba/
‘jug tshul gyi sgo nas rang spyi gnyis su dbye ba/ mthar thug gi gzhal bya rang
mtshan gcig tu bsdu ba’o//
[yul du byas tshul gyi sgo nas dbye ba/]
dang po la gsum ste/ chos gang yul bzhir ‘gyur dpyad/ yul can gang la yul bzhir
yod dpyad/ yul bzhi so so’i ngo bo’o//
dang po ni/ chos thams cad yul can gyi blo so so la ltos nas/ snang yul/ zhen yul/ ‘jug
yul gsumdu ‘gyur la/ gzung yul nimdo sde pas phyi’i skyemched lnga po kho na la ‘jug
cing/ sems tsampa’i lugs la gzungyul gyi rnamgzhagmed do// gnyis pa ni/ rtogmedma
‘khrul ba’i shes pa thams cad la snang yul yod cing/ rtogmed ‘khrul shes rnams la snang
yul med/ rtog pa thams cad la snang yul yod do// gzung yul ni/ don rig mngon\389
[ sumgnyis pokhona la yod cing/ zhenyul ni/ rtog padonmthun rnams la yod/ ‘jugyul
ni/ tshad ma dang/ rjod byed sgra don mthun dang/skyes bu rnams la yod do//
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gsum pa la/ snang yul/ gzung yul/ zhen yul/ ‘jug yul dang bzhi las/ dang po la
mtshan nyid dang/ dbye ba gnyis/ dang po ni/ des rnam par gtad pa’i sgo nas snang
ba’am/ rnam med du dngos su snang ba gang rung gyur pa’i yul lo// gnyis pa la/ rtog
med shes pa’i dang/ rtog pa’i snang yul gnyis/ dang po la rnam pa gtad pa’i sgo nas
snang yul du ‘gyur ba dang/ rnam pa ma gtad pa’i sgo nas snang yul du ‘gyur ba
gnyis/ dang po ni/ don rig mngon sum gyis gzung don lta bu/ gnyis pa ni/ rang rig
mngon sum gyis myang bya lta bu’o// rtog pa’i snang yul ni don spyi lta bu’o// yang
na yul bzhi’i nang tshan du gyur pa’i snang yul ni yul can gyi shes pa las rdzas
gzhan du med cing/ rang dus su snang ba la ‘jog pa rang rig mngon sum gyis myang
bya dang/ rtog med log shes la dngos su snang ba’i med pa gsal ba dang/ rtog pa la
dngos su snang ba’i don spyi gsum po kho na la ‘jog cing/ bar pa ni shes pa de’i
snang yul yin kyang spyir snang yul ma yin zhes pa rigs gter gyi dgongs pa yin nam
snyam ste dpyad do//
gnyis pa la mtshan nyid ni/ rang ‘dzin mngon sum la rang ‘dra’i rnam pa dngos su
gtod byed kyi phyi don no// dbye ba/ yul can gyi sgo nas dbang po’i mngon sum
gyis gzung yul dang/\390[ yid kyi mngon sum gyis gzung yul gnyis/ yul gyi sgo
nas gzugs sgra dri ro reg bya lnga’o//
gsum pa la mtshan nyid ni/ rang ‘dzin stangs kyis gtso bor byed pa’i blos zhen
nas rig par bya ba/ de la dbye na rtog pa tshad ma’i zhen yul dang/ bcad shes kyi
zhen yul gnyis/ dang po ni/ rjes dpag tshad ma’i ‘jug yul rnams so// gnyis pa ni/
tshad ma gnyis kyi ‘jug yul de nyid des drangs pa’i bcad shes kyi zhen yul du ‘gyur
ba lta bu’o//
bzhi pa la mtshan nyid ni/ yul can don mthun gyi byed pa ‘jug pa’i gzhir gyur pa’i
yul gyi gtso bo’o// dbye ba la yul can gyi sgo nas dbye na sngar ltar gsum las dang
po tshad ma’i ‘jug yul la mngon sum dang/ rjes dpag gi ‘jug yul gnyis/ dang po la
don rig mngon sum gyi ‘jug yul ni phyi rol gyi don rang mtshan dang/ rang rig
mngon sum gyi ‘jug yul ni shes pa rang mtshan dang/ rnal ‘byor mngon sum gyi ‘jug
yul ni mdo sde pa ltar na bdag med pas khyad par du byas pa’i phung po rang
mtshan dang/ rnam rig pa ltar na chos nyid rnams yin na83/ rjes dpag gi ‘jug yul ni
rtags yang dag gi bsgrub bya rnams la ‘jog go /sgra’i ‘jug yul ni ba lang rang mtshan
pa de ba lang zhes pa’i sgra don mthun gyi ‘jug yul yin pa lta bu’o//
[ngo bo’i sgo nas bden pa gnyis su dbye ba/]
gnyis pa’i ngo bo’i sgo nas bden pa gnyis la/ bye brag tu84 smra bas bcom pa’am
blos gzhig pa na der ‘dzin gyi blo mi ‘jug pa de kun rdzob bden pa’i mtshan nyid de/
dper na bcom pa na de ‘dzin gyi blo mi ‘jug pa bum pa lta bu \391[ dang/ blos
rdul rdzas brgyad so so phye pa na der ‘dzin gyi blo mi ‘jug pa ‘jig rten grags pa’i
chu lta bu’o// bcom pa’am blos gzhig pa na der ‘dzin gyi blo ‘jug pa de don dam
bden pa’i mtshan nyid de/ dper na gzugs kyi skye mched lta bu’o zhes ‘dod de/
mdzod las/ gang la bcom dang blo yis gzhan// bsal na de blo mi ‘jug pa// bum chu
bzhin du kun rdzob tu// yod de don dam yod gzhan no// zhes gsungs pa’i phyir ro//
mdo sde pas/ don dam par don byed nus pa dang mi nus pa’i chos gnyis de gnyis kyi
83 In K1, K2 also „na” but I read as “no”.
84 In K1 without „tu”.
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mtshan nyid du ‘dod de/ don dam don byed nus pa gang/ zhes sogs gsungs pa’i
phyir/ sems tsam pas/ gang la dngos su dmigs nas kun nas nyon mongs pa rgyas su
rung ba de kun rdzob bden pa’i mtshan nyid dang/ gang la dngos su dmigs nas rnam
byang rgyas pas khyab pa de don dam bden pa’i mtshan nyid du bzhed de/ kun btus
las/ gang la dmigs nas kun nas nyon mongs ‘phel bar85 ‘gyur ba’i dmigs pa ni kun
rdzob tu yod pa’o// gang la dmigs nas rnam par byung ba ‘phel bar ‘gyur ba’i dmigs
pa ni don dam du yod pa’o// zhes gsungs pa’i phyir/ dbu ma pas/ mthong ba yang
dag pa’i ‘dzin stangs kyis gzung bya de don dam bden pa’i mtshan nyid de/ dper na
‘phags rgyud kyi mnyam gzhag gi ‘dzin stangs kyis gzung bya lta bu’o// mthong ba
brdzun pa’i ‘dzin stangs kyis gzung bya de kun rdzob bden pa’i mtshan nyid de/
dper na so skye’i blo’i \392[ dngos yul lta bu zhes bzhed de/ ‘jug pa las/ dngos
kun yang dag brdzun par mthong ba yis// dngos rnyed bgo bo gnyis ni ‘dzin par
‘gyur// yang dag mthong yul gang de de nyid de// mthong ba rdzun pa’ang kun
rdzob bden par gsungs// zhes gsungs pas so//
[‘jug yul gyi sgo nas mngon lkog gnyis su phye ba/]
gsum pa ‘jug yul gyi sgo nas mngon lkog gnyis la mtshan nyid dang/ dbye ba
gnyis/ dang po mtshan nyid la don spyi la ma ltos par rtogs par bya ba dang/ don
spyi’i sgo nas rtogs par bya ba’o//
gnyis pa dbye ba la/ mngon gyur gyi dbye ba dang/ lkog gyur gyi dbye ba gnyis/
dang po la yul gyi sgo nas dbye ba dang/ yul can gyi sgo nas dbye ba gnyis las/ dang
po la chos can dang/ chos nyid gnyis/ dang po la don dang shes pa gnyis so// yul can
gyi sgo nas dbye ba la/ rtog med ma ‘khrul ba’i sgo nas dang/ rtog med ‘khrul shes
kyi sgo nas dbye ba gnyis las/ dang po la don rig mngon sum/ rang rig mngon sum/
rnal ‘byor mngon sum la mngon gyur dang gsum las/ dang po ni/ gzugs sogs don
lnga’o// gnyis pa ni shes pa thams cad do// gsum pa ni chos nyid lta bu’o// gnyis pa
ni/ zla gnyis de zla ba gnyis snang gi dbang shes la mngon gyur yin pa lta bu’o//
gnyis pa lkog gyur gyi dbye ba la yul dang yul can gyi dbye ba gnyis las/ dang po la
sngar ltar gsum las/ dang po ni bum pa de bum ‘dzin rtog pa la lkog gyur yin pa dang/
shes pa ni rang rgyud kyi shes pa de gzhan sems shes pa’imngon shesmed pa’i gang zag
la lkoggyur\393[ yin pa dang/ chos nyid so skye la lkog gyur yin pa lta bu’o// yul can
gyi sgo nas dbye ba la/ rjes dpag gi sgo nas dbye ba dang/ tshad min gyi blo’i sgo nas
dbye ba gnyis las/ dang po la dngos rtobs rjes dpag yid chos rjes dpags grags pa’i rjes
dpags la lkog gyur gsum ni gtan tshigs gsum po de’i bsgrub bya lta bu’o// gnyis pa la
bcad shes/ log shes/ the tshom la lkog gyur dang gsum las/ dang po ni/ sngon po de sngo
‘dzin dbang mngon gyis drangs pa’i nges shes la lkog gyur yin pa lta bu’o// gnyis pa ni
sgra rtagpade sgra rtag ‘dzin rtog pa la lkoggyur yin pa lta bu’o// gsumpani sgra rtagmi
rtag gang rung de de ltar the tshom za ba po’i the tshommngon gyur pa la de yin pa lta
bu’o// des na rtog med ltog shes la mngon gyur yin na mngon gyur yin pas ma khyab
cing/ rtog pa log shes la lkog gyur yin na lkog gyur yin pas ma khyab ste/ rtog med log
shes kyi snang yul yin na yodpasmakhyab pa’i phyir dang/ rtog pa log shes kyi zhenyul
85 K1 „par”.
Cognizable Object in Tshad ma rigs gter According... 983
123
yin na yod pas ma khyab pa’i phyir/ the tshom la lkog gyur yin pa la ni don la gnas pa’i
phyogs rnams lkog gyur yin la/ cig shog ni lkog gyur ma yin no//
[‘jug tshul gyi sgo nas rang spyi gnyis su phye ba/]
bzhi pa ‘jug tshul gyi sgo nas rang spyi gnyis la/ mtshan nyid dang/ dbye ba gnyis
las/ dang po ni rim bzhin/ yul dus rang bzhin ma ‘dres par gnas pa’i dngos po dang/
yul dus rang bzhin thun mong bar snang ba’i sgro btags\394[ so// yang na thun
mong ma yin par gnas pa’i dngos po dang/ thun mong bar snang ba’i sgro btags te/
rnam nges las/ de ni thun mong ma yin par gnas pa’i dngos po’i rang bzhin te/ rang
gi mtshan nyid do// ces gsungs pa’i dngos shugs gnyis las shes so// gnyis pa/ rang
mtshan la dbye na/ don dang shes pa rang mtshan gnyis/ dang po la phyi don bem po
dang/ nang don bem po gnyis/ dang po la/ gzugs sogs phyi’i skye mched lnga/ gnyis
pa la mig sogs nang gi skye mched lnga’o// shes pa rang mtshan la dbye na/ rnam
par shes pa tshogs drug ‘khor dang bcas pa yod do// spyi mtshan la dbye ba/ bod
snga rabs pa rnams/ ldog pa med dgag gi spyi dang/ blo’i gzhan sel ba’i spyi gnyis
gsungs kyang/ gzhung las bshad pa ni/ dngos po dang/ dngos med dang/ gnyis ka la
brten pa’i spyi gsum ste/ dngos dang dngos med gnyis ka la// brten phyir spyi de’ang
rnam pa gsum// zhes gsungs pa’i phyir/ yang gcig la tha dad du ‘byed pa’i spyi/ tha
dad la gcig tu sdud pa’i spyi/ gcig la gcig tu snang ba’i spyi/ tha dad la tha dad du
snang ba’i spyi dang bzhir dbyer rung ste/ gzhan sel la de ltar phye ba gang zhig
spyi dang spyi mtshan gzhan sel gsum gnad gcig pa’i phyir ro//
[mthar thug gi gzhal bya rang mtshan gcig tu bsdu ba/]
lnga pamthar thug gi gzhal bya rangmtshan gcig tu bsdu ba ni/ ‘o na/ rang gi mtshan
nyid gcig gzhal bya// zhes sogs gzhal bya rang mtshan gcig tu gsungs pa’i don ji ltar
snyam\395[ na/ spyir rtog ge’i gshung lugs las/ dang po grub mtha’ la zhugs ma
zhugs thams cad la grags pa’i tshad ma ngos bzungs nas/ de dang ‘dra ba’i ston pa tshad
ma’i skyes bur bsgrub pa skabs kyi don yin te/ mi bsluma shes don gsal ngos bzung nas/
de’i ‘og tu/ de ltan bcom ldan tshadma nyid// ces gsungs pa’i phyir/ grubmtha’ la zhugs
ma zhugs thams cad la grags pa tshad ma’i don ni/ rnam nges las/ phan pa dangmi phan
pa thob pa dang spong ba ni nges par yang dag pa’i shes pa sngon du ‘gro ba can yin pas
zhes pa’i skabs nas bstan pa ltar phan gnod nus pa’i yul la blang dor byed pa’i rgyur gyur
pa’i shes pa yin la/ de lta bu’i tshadmas blang bya’i phan pa nus pa’i yul dang/ dor bya’i
gnod par nus pa’i yul ni rang mtshan kho na yin te/ rang mtshan kho nas phan gnod nus
kyi spyi mtshan gyis de mi nus pa’i phyir te/ de ni blang dor ‘bras can pas// skyes bu
thams cad ‘jug pa yin// zhes dang/ don byed nus pa ma yin la// don gnyer brtags pas ci
zhig bya// zhes gsungs pa’i phyir dang/ rangmtshan gcig nyid la don rigmngon sum ‘jal
byed du ‘jug pa’i tshe gzung yul dang/ rjes dpags ‘jal byed du ‘jug pa’i tshe zhen yul yin
la/ tshadmade gnyis la brten nas skyes bu ‘jug pa’i tshemi bslu bas na ‘jug yul yin te/ ‘di
la dgongs nas/ rigs gter rang ‘gral las/ rangmtshan de nyid dngos su ‘jal na gzung yul yin
la// lkog gyur du\396[ ’jal na zhen yul la yin cing/ gnyis ka yang skyes bu ‘jug nami
bzlu bas ‘jug yul yin no// zhes gsungs so// dngos su ‘jal na zhes pa’i don yang mngon
gyur du ‘jal na zhes pa’i don yin pa tshig grogs kyi stobs kyis shes so//
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mdor na rang mtshan gcig nyid la tshad ma mngon rjes gnyis ‘jal byed du ‘jug pa’i
tshe ‘jug tshul gyi gzhal bya la rang spyi gnyis su yod kyang ‘jug yul gyi86 gzhal bya
rang mtshan kho na yin pa ni/ rang gi mtshan nyid gcig gzhal bya// zhes sogs kyi
dgongs pa ‘khrul pa med pa ste/ lha’i ‘grel par/ de ltar na rang gi mtshan nyid kho na
rang gi ngo bo dang/ gzhan gyi ngo bo’i sgo nas rtogs pa’i phyir/ de dag gi mtshan
nyid ci ‘dra pa87 dang/ gzhal bya gnyis nyid du rnam par gzhag nas zhes gsungs so//
[rtsod pa spong ba/]
gsum pa rtsod pa spong ba la gnyis te/ ‘khrul shes yul med la rtsod pa spong ba
dang/ gzung yul rang mtshan la rtsod pa spong ba’o// dang po la bzhi ste/ gzhal bya
gnyis su gsungs pa dang ‘gal ba spong ba/ don spyi dang med pa gsal ba yul du
mtshungs pa’i rtsod pa spong ba/ myong ba dang ‘gal ba spong ba/ dgag pa tshad
mas mi rtogs par thal ba spong ba’o//
dang po ni/ rang mtshan gcig nyid la mngon rjes gnyis ‘jal byed du ‘jug pa’i tshe
‘jug yul rang mtshan kho na yin na/ slob dpon phyogs glang gis gzhal bya gnyis su
gsungs pa dang ‘gal lo zhe na/ skyon med de/ rang mtshan gcig nyid rang gi ngo
bo’i sgo nas rtogs pa dang/ gzhan don spyi’i sgo nas rtogs pa’i rtogs tshul\397[
gnyis yod pas rang spyi gnyis su bzhag pa yin pa’i phyir/ gnyis pa ni/ don spyi don
la med kyang gzhal bya yin na/ med pa gsal ba yang de dang mtshungs so zhe na/
skyon med de/ snga ma ni rang mtshan ma yin yang de la brten nas ‘jug yul rang
mtshan thob pa yod cing/ phyi ma ni rang gi ngo bo rang mtshan ma yin cing/ de la
brten nas ‘jug yul rang mtshan thob pa yang med pa’i phyir/ gsum pa ni/ snang yul
rang mtshanma yin na/ shes pa la gsal bar snang ba dang ‘gal lo zhe na/ skyonmed de/
rtog pa la gsal bar snang ba’i rnam pa’i cha dang/ de la phyi rol du sgra btags pa’i cha
gnyis las/ dang po ni/ shes pa dang/ phyi ma ni/ spyi mtshan yin pa’i phyir ro// bzhi pa
ni/ dngos med ‘jal byed kyi tshad mamed par thal/ blang dor byed pa’i rgyur gyur pa’i
tshadma’i ‘jug yul yin na/ rangmtshan yin dgos pa’i phyir zhe na/ skyonmed de/ dngos
med ‘jal byed kyi tshad ma yod med dpyod par byed pa’i phyir/ de dag gi don rigs gter
las/ yul gnyis bzhed pas gnod ce na// zhes pa nas bsgrub pa’i phyir na ‘gal ba med// ces
pa’i bar gyi tshigs bcad phyed dang lnga’i don ma ‘khrul bar bshad zin to//
gnyis pa la/ rtsod pa dang/ lan gnyis las/ dang po ni/ gzung yul gyi gzhal bya rang
mtshan gcig tu ‘dod pa mi ‘thad de/ phyi rol don du gyur ba’i gzung yul mkhas pas
bkag /shes par gyur pa’i gzung yul ‘dir mi srid pa’i phyir ro zhes pa’o// gnyis\398[
pa la/ grub mtha’i rnam gzhag spyir bstan pa dang/ gzhan gyis brtags pa dgag pa/ bde
bar gshegs pa’i lugs bsgrub pa dang gsum las/
dang po ni/ mu stegs ngo bo nyid rgyur smra ba rnams kyis ngo no nyid rgyur
‘dod pa dang/ dbang phyug pa rnams kyis dbang phyug rgyur ‘dod pa dang/ grags
can pa rnams kyis gsto bo rgyur ‘dod pa dang/ gzegs zan dang/ nyan thos sde gnyis
kyis rdul kyis rdul phran der ‘dod pa dang/ sems tsam pas snang ba thams cad sems
su ‘dod pa dang/ ngo bo nyid med par smra bas chos thams cad don dam spros pa
dang bral ba dang/ kun rdzob tu dngos smra ba de dag dang mtshungs kyang rung
‘dzin rten gyu grags pa dang mtshungs kyang rung bar bzhed do//
86 K1 without „’jug yul gyi”.
87 K1, K2 „ba”.
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gnyis pa ni/ ngo bo nyid rgyur ‘dod pa ni mi ‘thad de/ rgyu med las skye ba ‘gog
pa’i rigs pas gnod pa’i phyir/ dbang phyug dang gtso bo rgyur ‘dod pa yang mi ‘thad
de/ rtag pa las skye ba ‘gog pa’i rigs pas gnod pa’i phyir/
gsum pa la/ dgongs pa ngos gzung ba dang/ de nyid slob dpon gyis ji ltar gtan la
phab pa dang gnyis las/ dang po ni/ bde bar gshegs pas tha snyad la ‘jug pa’i tshe
rdul phran zhal gyis bzhes la/ ‘di la bye brag smra ba dang/ mdo sde pa’i grub mtha’
gnyis yod do/ tha snyad kyi de kho na nyid la ‘jug pa’i tshe sems tsam zhal gyis
bzhes la/ ‘di la rnam bden brdzun gnyis yod do// don dam pa’i de kho na nyid la ‘jug
pa’i tshe chos thams cad spros pa dang bral ba la ‘jug par mdzad do//
gnyis pa ni/ de ltar sangs\399[ rgyas pa’i grub mtha’ bzhi las/ slob dpon gyis
gang gtan la dbab pa yin zhe na/ ‘di la don rig dang/ rnam rigs gnyis las/ dang po
khas len pa’i tshe/ bye brag tu smra bas dbang shes kyis rang dang dus mnyam pa’i
phyi don rnam med rjen char du ‘dzin par ‘dod pa de bkag nas skad cig snga mar
rkyen gsum tshogs pa las skad cig gnyis par dbang shes yul gyi rnam ldan du skyes
pa tsam la phyi don rtogs par ‘dod pa mdo sde pa’i grub mtha’ zhal gyis bzhes te/
slob dpon nyid kyi zhal nas/ gal te phyi rol dpyod la ‘jug pa na// kho bos mdo sde’i
skabs la rnam par brten// zhes gsungs par grags so//
gnyis pa/ rnam rig zhal gyis bzhes pa’i tshe rnam bden pas dbang shes la rags par
snang ba bden grub tu ‘dod pa de bkag nas rnam med zhal gyis bzhes te/ de phyir don
dang shes pa la/ rags snang yodmin zhes sogs gsungs pa’i phyir/ des na skabs ‘dir mdo
sems gyis las/ gong du smras pa’i rtsod pa de mdo sde pa’i dbang du byes pa yin na/
gtan tshigs dang poma grub ste/ de’i lugs la rnampa gtod byed kyi phyi don nyid gzung
yul du ‘jog pa’i phyir ro// sems tsam pa’i dbang du byas na ‘dod pa yin te/ de’i lugs la
gzung yul gyi dbang du byas pa’i yul dang yul can grub pa med pa’i phyir/ don ‘di la
dgongs nas/ rigs gter du/ ji srid phyi rol khas len pa// de srid rgyu la gzung yul zer// shes
bya nang gir zhugs pa na// yul\400[ dang yul can grub pa med// ces gsungs so// yul
brtag pa’i rab tu byed pa ste dang po bzhad zin to// //
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Outline of the chapter “Cognizable object [shes bya’i yul]” 
1. mtshan nyid
2. dbye ba
2.1. gzhan lugs dgag pa
2.2. rang lugs bzhag pa
2.2.1. yul du byes tshul gyi sgo nas yul bzhir dbye ba
2.2.1.1. chos gang yul bzhi ‘gyur dbyad pa
2.2.1.2. yul can gang la yul bzhir yod dbyad pa
2.2.1.3. yul bzhi so so’i bgo bo
2.2.1.3.1. snang yul
2.2.1.3.1.1. mtshan nyid
2.2.1.3.1.2. dbye ba
A 2.2.1.3.1.2.1. rtog med shes pa’i snang yul
2.2.1.3.1.2.1.1. rnam pa gtad pa’i sgo nas snang yul
2.2.1.3.1.2.1.2. rnam pa ma gtad pa’i sho nas snang yul
A 2.2.1.3.1.2.2. stog pa’i snang yul
B 2.2.1.3.1.2.1. rang rig mngon sum gyis myong bya
B 2.2.1.3.1.2.2. rtog med log shes la dngos su snang ba’i med pa 
gsal ba
B 2.2.1.3.1.2.3. rtog pa la dngos su snang ba’i don spyi
2.2.1.3.2. gzung yul
2.2.1.3.2.1. mtshan nyid
2.2.1.3.2.2. dbye ba
2.2.1.3.2.2.1. yul can gyi sgo nas dbye ba
2.2.1.3.2.2.1.1. dbang po’i mngon sum gyis gzung yul
2.2.1.3.2.2.1.2. yid kyi mngon sum gyis gzung yul
2.2.1.3.2.2.2. yul gyi gyi sgo nas dbye ba
2.2.1.3.2.2.2.1. gzugs
2.2.1.3.2.2.2.2. sgra
2.2.1.3.2.2.2.3. dri
2.2.1.3.2.2.2.4. ro
2.2.1.3.2.2.2.5. reg bya
2.2.1.3.3. zhen yul
2.2.1.3.3.1. mtshan nyid
2.2.1.3.3.2. dbye ba
2.2.1.3.3.2.1. rtog pa tshad ma’i zhen yul
2.2.1.3.3.2.2. bcad shes kyi zhen yul
2.2.1.3.4. ‘jug yul
2.2.1.3.4.1. mtshan nyid
2.2.1.3.4.2. yul can gyi sgo nas dbye ba
2.2.1.3.4.2.1. tshad ma’i ‘jug yul
2.2.1.3.4.2.1.1. mngon sum gyi ‘jug yul
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2.2.1.3.4.2.1.1.1. don rig mngon sum gyi ‘jug yul
2.2.1.3.4.2.1.1.2. rang rig mngon sum gyi ‘jug yul
2.2.1.3.4.2.1.1.3. rnal ‘byor mngon sum gyi ‘jug 
yul
2.2.1.3.4.2.1.1.3a phung po
2.2.1.3.4.2.1.1.3b chos nyid
2.2.1.3.4.2.1.2. rjes dpag gi ‘jug yul
2.2.1.3.4.2.2. sgra’i ‘jug yul
2.2.2. ngo bo’i sgo nas bden pa gnyis su dbye ba
2.2.3. ’jug yul gyi sgo nas ngon gnyis su phe ba
2.2.3.1. mtshan nyid
2.2.3.2. dbye ba
2.2.3.2.1. mngon gyur gyi dbye ba
2.2.3.2.1.1. yul gyi sgo nas dbye ba
2.2.3.2.1.1.1. chos can
2.2.3.2.1.1.1.1. don
2.2.3.2.1.1.1.2. shes pa
2.2.3.2.1.1.2. chos nyid
2.2.3.2.1.2. yul can gyi sgo nas dbye ba 
2.2.3.2.1.2.1. rtog med ma ‘khrul pa’i sgo nas dbye ba
2.2.3.2.1.2.1.1. don rig mngon sum gyi mngon gyur
2.2.3.2.1.2.1.2. rang rig mngon sum gyi mngon gyur
2.2.3.2.1.2.1.3. rnal ‘byor mngon sum gyi mngon gyur
2.2.3.2.1.2.2. rtog med ‘khrul shes kyi sgo nas dbye ba
2.2.3.2.2. lkog gyur gyi dbye ba
2.2.3.2.2.1. yul gyi dbye ba
2.2.3.2.2.1.1. phyi don
2.2.3.2.2.1.2. rang rgyud kyi shes pa
2.2.3.2.2.1.3. chos nyid
2.2.3.2.2.2. yul can gyi dbye ba 
2.2.3.2.2.2.1. rjes dpag gi sgo nas dbye ba
2.2.3.2.2.2.1.1. dngos stogs rjes dpag gi lkog gyur
2.2.3.2.2.2.1.2. yid ches rjes dpag gi lkog gyur
2.2.3.2.2.2.1.3. grags pa’i rjes dpag gi lkog gyur
2.2.3.2.2.2.2. tshad min gyi sgo nas dbye ba
2.2.3.2.2.2.2.1. bcad shes pa’i lkog gyur
2.2.3.2.2.2.2.2. log shes pa’i lkog gyur
2.2.3.2.2.2.2.3. the tshom gyi lkog gyur
2.2.4. ’jug tshul gyi sgo nas rang spyi gnyi su dbye ba
2.2.4.1. mtshan nyid
2.2.4.2. dbye ba 
2.2.4.2.1. rang mtshan
2.2.4.2.1.1. don
2.2.4.2.1.1.1. phyi don
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2.3.2.2.1. grub mtha’ rnam bzhag spyir bstan pa
2.3.2.2.2. gzhan gyis brtag pa dgag pa
2.3.2.2.3. bde bar gshegs pa’i lugs bsgrub pa
2.3.2.2.3.1. dgongs pa ngos bzung ba
2.3.2.2.3.2. de nyid slob dpon gyis ji ltar gtan la dbab pa
2.3.2.2.3.2.1. don rig
2.3.2.2.3.2.2. rnam rig
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TR—Sa skya Pan
˙
d
˙
ita [Sa skya paNDi ta kun dga’ rgyal mtshan], Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi rtsa ba dang
‘grel, Varanasi, Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies [Sakya Students’ Union] 2008.
S—Śākya mchog ldan, Tshad ma’i mdo dang gzhung lugs sde bdun gyi de kho na nyid bsdus pa in: blo
gros mtha’ yas pa’i mdzod, Kathmandu: Rigpe Dorje Publications 2009, vol. 12.
Na¯ga¯rjuna, Śūnyatāsaptati, Sarnath-Varanasi: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1996.
Hugon P. (Ed.), mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge, Tshad ma shes rab sgron ma (2004), Wien: Arbeitskreis
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